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While  the role  of  secure  property  rights  contributing  to  sustainable  natural  resource  management  is
increasingly  recognized,  translating  that  into  practice  is  more  challenging,  especially  in developing
countries.  This  article  presents  a  framework  for understanding  the  role  of  property  rights  for  effective
irrigation  systems  and  then  explores  the  complexity  of  property  rights  to land,  water,  and  infrastructure
and  their  underlying  institutions.  Understanding  property  rights  in  practice  requires  acknowledging  legal
pluralism—the  coexistence  of  many  types  and  sources  of  law,  which  can  be used  as  the  basis  for  claiming
rights  over  the  resources.  Property  rights  do not  necessarily  imply  full ownership,  but  are  composed  of
different  bundles  of rights  that  may  be held  by  different  claimants—the  state,  user  groups,  families,  or
individuals.  These  rights  are  critical  for the authority,  incentives,  and  resources  for irrigation  operation
and  maintenance.  As  resources  become  more  scarce,  property  rights  systems  need  to adapt  to  reduce  con-
ﬂict  and  provide  incentives  for saving  water.  However,  efforts  to improve  irrigation  by  changing  property
rights  systems  have  often  failed  because  they  have  not recognized  the  difﬁculty  of transplanting  property
rights  systems  from  one  place  to another.  Institutional  change  needs  to  be  seen  as  an  organic  process,
building  on  existing  norms  and  practices,  rather  than  as an  exercise  in social  engineering.
©  2014  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under the  CC  BY-NC-ND
1998). Moreover, as North (1990) notes, institutional change is path
dependent: it is inherently shaped by the history of a particular. Introduction
Experience with the past 30 years of irrigation has shown that
echnology alone is not sufﬁcient to ensure productivity gains,
et alone sustainability. In many cases, the technologies were not
dopted or maintained, or the poor, women, and other marginal-
zed groups were excluded from the beneﬁts of technologies.
ppropriate institutions are needed to accompany technologies for
ustainable irrigation.
Among these key institutions, property rights play a particu-
arly important role. When resources are abundant, there is little
eed to deﬁne property rights, but as the resource becomes more
carce, users of the resource compete and even come into conﬂict.
n such contexts, there is pressure to deﬁne property rights over the
esource, to clarify expectations, and assign both rights and duties
Otsuka and Place, 2001; Young, in press).
While the contribution of secure property rights to sustainable
atural resource management is increasingly recognized in calls
or policy reforms, translating that into practice is more challeng-
ng (Deininger, 2003). This applies to almost all natural resources,
∗ Tel.: +1 6364051711.
E-mail address: R.Meinzen-Dick@cgiar.org
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.agwat.2014.03.017
378-3774/© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article unlicense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
including land, forests, and ﬁsheries, but even more so to water,
which is a mobile and often fugitive resource, difﬁcult to measure
or control, with many different uses and values, both economic and
noneconomic (Rogers et al., 1995). Efforts to “improve” irrigation
by changing property rights systems have often failed because
they have not recognized the difﬁculties involved in institutional
change, especially of property rights.1
While water rights, and especially water rights reforms, are
complex in any context, the challenges are particularly severe in
developing countries.2 A major reason for this is the frequent lack
of state capacity to carry out the reforms as envisaged (as described
by Garduno, 2005 for Mexico or Schreiner, 2013 for South Africa).
However, customary water rights are also likely to be particularly
strong in developing countries, often varying from one context to
another, and differing from state law (von Benda-Beckmann et al.,place. This means that transplanting property rights systems from
1 For a review of some of these challenges in property rights change, see Libecap
(1998).
2 See cases in Boelens and Hoogendam (2002), Bruns et al. (2005), Ingram and
Brown (1998).
der the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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gig. 1. The role of property rights and coordination institutions for sustainable
rrigation.
ne place to another will not yield the same results, as shown by
olanes (2013) in his analysis of efforts in the 1990s to pass a water
aw in Peru that was modeled after Chile’s legal framework of highly
rivatized water resources.
Thus while property rights can play a crucial role in sustainable
rrigation in developing countries, any reforms to achieve this aim
eed to be based on a sound understanding of property rights to
and, water, and infrastructure and their underlying institutions.
f these, land rights have been dealt with most extensively, both in
cholarship and in policy (see, for example, Deininger, 2003 or FAO,
012). The focus of this article is therefore on rights to water and
econdarily irrigation infrastructure. However, rights to all three
f these key resources are inextricably intertwined (see Hodgson,
004).
This article presents a framework for understanding the role of
roperty rights for effective irrigation systems and then explores
he complexity of these property rights, with particular reference to
onditions in developing countries. Applying the framework helps
o identify the situations in which institutional issues of coordina-
ion and property rights are likely to be important for sustainable
rrigation (and where, conversely, they are less likely to require
uch attention). Subsequent sections of the article discuss some of
he institutional complexities, particularly of property rights, and
heir implications for programs seeking to improve the sustaina-
ility of irrigation systems.
. Key institutions for sustainable irrigation
Institutions are the “rules of the game” that govern behavior
n society (North, 1990:1). Fig. 1 illustrates the importance of two
ypes of key institutions for irrigation and agricultural water man-
gement: those that provide coordination and property rights. The
ertical axis illustrates the spatial scale of a technology, from an
ndividual plot, through a whole farm, to one that covers several
arms, a village, to a region. All approaches that are above the scale
f the individual farm require some form of coordination—either
y local organizations, the state, or the market. For example, a drip
rrigation kit may  be adopted by an individual small farmer, by his
r her self. Even a well may  serve just one farm, but where holdings
re very small and tubewells have large capacity, farmers may  join
ogether to buy and operate a tubewell, or the state may  install and
perate it, or one farmer can install it and sell water to neighbors.
s we move up the spatial scale, a small check dam may  serve a
roup of farmers. A watershed management program may  serveanagement 145 (2014) 23–31
several communities. Canal irrigation systems and reservoirs can
serve up to thousands of farmers, and even cross provincial lines.
Finally, transboundary river basins cross national boundaries. In
each case, some form of coordination is required to govern provi-
sion and expropriation: to ensure that the infrastructure is built and
maintained, and to allocate and distribute the water among users of
the same source, and settle disputes. The greater the spatial scale,
the higher the level of coordination that is needed, as indicated by
the corresponding arrow on the right side, to balance the spatial
arrow on the left. That coordination may  be provided by the state
or by collective action (or, in some cases, even by the market).
Similarly, the lower horizontal axis indicates the permanence
of a technology or approach, or the time frame between when an
investment is made and its returns are realized. The longer the
temporal scale, the greater the need for property rights to provide
authorization and incentive to make the investment (Knox et al.,
2002). Even a tenant or a wife without independent land rights can
install a drip kit, but may  not be allowed to install a treadle pump
or tubewell, because she does not have the decision-making (man-
agement) rights over that land, and she may  not have the incentive
to install and maintain terracing or drainage systems for salin-
ity control. The arrow on the upper horizontal axis indicates that
secure property rights become more important as the time frame
of irrigation practices increase. Even those with decision-making
rights may  not have the incentive to make long-term investments
unless they have secure tenure, to know that they will beneﬁt from
the investment. Although security of tenure is often thought of in
terms of rights to the land, people may  not be willing to invest
in irrigation systems if they do not also have secure rights to the
water that will give them the returns. This has been the problem
with many irrigation management transfer systems, where farm-
ers were expected to bear the costs, without secure rights to the
water from the systems.
While the exact location of any type of irrigation on Fig. 1
would depend on the size of the farms and the scale, as well as
the cost/return ratio, of the particular technology, this framework
provides a useful starting point to ask which institutions are likely
to be critical. As water uses increase, even seemingly “indepen-
dent” water users will be affected by, and have an impact on, other
water uses and users. For example, Asquith (2006) describes how
immigration and more intensive land use upstream had impacts
downstream in the Los Negros Valley of Bolivia. This increasing
interaction between uses within basins calls for better institutional
arrangements to coordinate water uses (as described by Asquith,
2006). Property rights are important in this regard because they
clarify who can use and manage the land, water, or infrastruc-
ture, and what responsibilities they have toward the resource and
toward others. Coordination institutions help to set and enforce
those rules about the allocation of water and responsibilities. These
issues are most apparent in surface water ﬂows and irrigation,
but also applies to groundwater irrigation. The following sec-
tions provide more details on the institutions for coordination and
property rights, with special attention to their implications for sus-
tainable irrigation.
3. Coordination institutions
The example of the tubewell cited above illustrates that coordi-
nation functions can be provided by the state (a public tubewell
that supplies many farms), collective action (farmer group) or
markets (farmer selling, buying or trading water). How well each
of those institutions functions will determine whether farmers
receive adequate and timely water supplies. For example, in the
1970s and 1980s there were numerous state-run tubewells in India,
Bangladesh, and Pakistan that should have allowed economies
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f scale by using large-scale pumps to irrigate many surround-
ng farms. These large pumps offer greater potential technical
fﬁciency over small-scale pumps. But these potential technical
fﬁciency gains were often not realized because of poor operational
erformance of the government agencies running and maintain-
ng the pumps. Instead of government-operated tubewells, a group
f smallholder farmers may  get together to make the investment
n drilling the well, installing a pump, and operating it (collective
ction coordination), or an individual farmer may  install and oper-
te the well, and sell water to neighbors. Shah and Raju (1988) argue
hat groundwater markets are much more effective than state tube-
ells in serving farmers’ water needs in India. Meinzen-Dick (1996)
ompared the performance of shared tubewells and groundwater
arkets in Pakistan, ﬁnding that smallholder farmers were quite
ell served by groundwater markets, but when the water became
ery scarce, the well owners would deny water to water purchasers,
ho had little recourse against more powerful well owners.
Which institution is most appropriate depends on the particu-
ar conditions—e.g. scale, technical sophistication of the technology
nd the farmers, cultural factors (social capital, market orienta-
ion), and state capacity. In general, the advantages of the state are
reatest at the largest scale, and collective action at more localized
evels (although there are exceptions). Markets are highly variable
n whether they provide effective coordination among smallhold-
rs, but seem to come in where machinery is involved, where it is
elatively easy to measure water deliveries and exclude those who
o not pay (as from a tubewell or piped system), and where users
ave alternative sources so that there is competition and they are
ot dependent on one provider.
If group-based (collective action) approaches are selected by
rograms for water management or technology dissemination, it
s important to look beyond the formal rules and membership
oles to see whether the group is actually acting collectively:
oo many water user organizations exist only “on paper” and
o not actually work together. Moreover, it is important to con-
ider who is included and excluded from active membership and
ecision-making. This means asking about women as well as men,
and owners and tenants, farmers and other water users (e.g.
shers, livestock keepers, home gardens, domestic users, other
nterprises). There may  be formal as well as informal barriers to
articipation, different motivations and returns to be considered.
here are indications that organizations with active participation
f men  and women may  be more effective than single-sex organi-
ations in managing resources like water because they draw upon
he skills and resources of both, but establishing active mixed orga-
izations is also more difﬁcult than for single-sex organizations,
specially where there is high gender segregation in the society
Pandolfelli et al., 2008). All of these factors should be considered
n relation to the objectives of the program when identifying the
ppropriate strategy for establishing or working with groups for
rrigation. Unless there is a strong basis of collective action, group-
ased approaches may  require signiﬁcant investment of time and
acilitation to build up the necessary social capital to be effective.
nless the groups are relatively homogeneous with active partic-
pation of men  and women, further investment may  be required
o get diverse groups to work together. Where poor literacy and
umeracy exist, adult education programs may  be needed to sup-
ort group functioning as well as increase overall human capital for
overty reduction.
Many irrigation management transfer programs that have
ought to use farmer organizations for water management (Garces-
estrepo et al., 2007). One clear lesson from this and other irrigation
anagement reforms is that there are no universal formulas or
lueprint approaches; rather there is a need for adaptation to local
onditions, and as they change over time (Merrey et al., 2007). The
riangles on the right-hand side of Fig. 1 are not only an indicatoranagement 145 (2014) 23–31 25
of the broad comparative advantages of state and collective action
institutions at each level, but also as a reminder of the overlap of
both types of institutions, and the need for them to work together,
as in co-management approaches. Instead of the state crowding
out collective action, or local groups having to develop all techni-
cal capacity on their own, it is preferable to seek collaboration. For
example, state agencies may  provide technical backstopping, but
recognize that farmers have important knowledge of local condi-
tions, or state agencies may  facilitate access to external resources
or help resolve disputes. This is the premise behind a growing num-
ber of catchment forums (as in South Africa) and other multi stake
holder platforms. But even this is not straightforward: as Komakech
and van der Zaag (2013) indicate in their study of catchment forums
in Tanzania that a detailed study of local institutional arrangements
is needed as a starting point, with attention to power structures,
including whether large farmers, hydropower, or other inﬂuential
actors will (or will not) participate.
Similarly, there are options for combining market mechanism
with user groups and the state. In identifying the potential for water
markets, Rosegrant and Binswanger (1994) recognize the impor-
tance of user groups to provide coordination among smallholders
involved in water trades above the very local level, and overall
state regulation. Similar combinations of market, collective action,
and state institutions are also seen in payment for environmen-
tal services or watershed management programs that compensate
upstream users for changing their water use patterns to improve
the ﬂow, quality, or timing of water downstream (e.g. Asquith,
2006; Swallow et al., 2002, 2006). Because the coordinating institu-
tion will need to have at least some control over the infrastructure
and even the water itself, the choice of coordinating institution (or
institutions) also has strong implications for property rights. The
implications of this are discussed in more detail in the following
section on property rights.
4. Understanding property rights
There are numerous deﬁnitions of property rights, including:
“the capacity to call upon the collective to stand behind one’s
claim to a beneﬁt stream” (Bromley, 1991:15), “the claims, enti-
tlements and related obligations among people regarding the use
and disposition of a scarce resource” (Furubotn and Pejovich,
1972:1139–1140), or “the social institutions that deﬁne or delimit
the range of privileges granted to individuals to speciﬁc assets, such
as parcels of land or water.  . .”  (Libecap, 1998:77).
Key elements in these deﬁnitions are that property rights are
social institutions: relationships among people with regard to
resources. They entail recognized claims and obligations, rights and
duties or responsibilities (Commons, 1968). To be valid, rights must
be accompanied by a duty of others to respect those rights. The
second set of duties or responsibilities are the responsibilities of
the right-holder, which may  be related to use or provision: to use
the resource in certain ways (e.g. without polluting the water), or
to provide for the construction or maintenance of facilities (e.g.
irrigation infrastructure).
Ribot and Peluso (2003) distinguish between access to resources
(e.g. being physically able to get water) and rights (entitlements).
A tail end farmer may  have a right to water, but might not be able
to get access because those upstream take too much. A farmer may
also have access due to physical location, force, or even stealth,
even if he or she does not have a right to the water. Many water
users do not have formalized rights to the water they depend on for
their livelihoods. Pradhan and Pradhan (2000) provide an example
of this distinction between access and rights from the hills of Nepal,
in which irrigators from one system would allow farmers from
another area to use water under what may  be referred to as “tol-
erated use”, as long as the farmers from the second system did not
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laim rights over that water. However, this access was  not enough
or the latter farmers, who used a range of strategies to claim rights
ver that water. Pradhan and Pradhan (2000:201) ﬁnd that this has
roader applicability to many farmer-managed systems:
Wherever possible they divert water from new (uncontested)
sources, and if this is not possible they try to acquire water
from sources used by others by negotiating, disputing, ‘stealing’
water on the sly, or forcefully acquiring water, often using polit-
ical or administrative connections. The farmers are not satisﬁed
with just acquiring water; their long-term goal is to legitimize
their access to the water source, that is, to establish rights to the
water. . . to get their claims to a share of the water from a water
source accepted by other users and competitors.
With regard to irrigation systems, there are three types of prop-
rty rights that are important: to the land, the infrastructure, and
he water. All three of these resources are necessary for produc-
ive use of the water, and how rights over these resources are
istributed will affect both the amount and distribution of beneﬁts.
Recognizing property rights to water (as well as irrigation infra-
tructure) often requires going beyond simplistic, legalistic, or
xternally-imposed assumptions. When discussing water rights
ith government ofﬁcials, I have often heard “There are no water
ights here” or “The State owns all water.” Both of these statements
erive from a very narrow understanding of property rights. Con-
entional images of property rights often derive from images of
nencumbered land rights, with ﬁxed boundaries, within which the
ndividual “owner”, backed by a state-issued title, can do whatever
e (or more rarely, she) chooses with the resource.3 Those bound-
ries are seen as rigid and unchanging, dividing people between
hose on the inside and outside. Certainly these conditions rarely
pply to water, particularly in developing countries.
But this view of property rights is ﬂawed, even for land. As
oted above, property rights are above all, social institutions, which
eﬁne relationships among people. They connect more than they
ivide. Rights are never unencumbered. Instead of “ownership” that
mplies rights to do whatever one wants to the resource, it is bet-
er to think of “bundles of rights” that may  be held by different
laimants, including individuals, households, water user groups,
ommunities, and the state. Indeed, the inter linkages between
hese different claimants on the resource can even be conceptual-
zed as a “web of interests” (Arnold, 2002). Furthermore, all rights
o not derive from the state: there may  be many different sources
f property rights. Each of these aspects apply, to some extent,
ven to immobile property in industrialized countries. But they are
specially relevant to property rights in developing countries, and
specially to rights over a ﬂuid and often fugitive resource such as
ater. The following sections provide more detail on legal plural-
sm and bundles of rights, as they pertain to irrigation systems.
.1. Legal pluralism
Understanding property rights in practice requires acknowledg-
ng legal pluralism—the coexistence of many types and sources of
aw, which can be used as the basis for claiming rights over the
esources or regulations on what can be done with them.4 This is
ften thought of in terms of “statutory” and “customary” law, but it
s more complex than that. State law itself may  be plural, with dif-
erent – and even inconsistent –.laws issued for different types of
ater use. Komakech et al. (2012) describe how water use permits
3 These notions can be traced back to English common law, notably to Blackstone
1766).
4 For a more complete review on legal pluralism and property rights, see Meinzen-
ick and Pradhan (2002), Meinzen-Dick and Nkonya (2007).anagement 145 (2014) 23–31
are interpreted and enforced differently by various administrative
units in Tanzania. Customary law is yet more diverse, differing
between communities (however deﬁned) and, because it is often
unwritten, even within a community. Moreover, although “custom”
is often interpreted as being rigid and unchanging, in fact “custom-
ary” law changes, often quite rapidly, to the extent that they may
be referred to as “living law” instead (Ehrlich, 1936).
Beyond this conventional dichotomy there are international
laws and treaties, such as the Ramsar Convention governing
wetlands,5 or international treaties governing shared water-
courses. Each irrigation project generates its own  regulations, such
as which parts of the command area are authorized to receive water
in each season, from which date, and what the water users are
required to do (and are prohibited from doing). Water users’ asso-
ciations generate their own rules regarding the manner in which
different people may  draw water, and what each needs to provide
for the system. Because of the fundamental importance of water
for life itself, religious laws and rules also create the basis for water
rights, as illustrated in Islamic water law (Faruqui et al., 2001) or
the Balinese subak irrigation systems, which derive much of the
authority for their detailed system of water rights from a series
of temples, from the local ﬁeld canal up to the whole watershed
(Lansing, 1991). Even local norms and sayings can become the basis
for claiming water rights. For example, in Kenya Onyango et al.
(2007) relate how a local proverb that “even the hyena has a right
to water” is the articulation of a norm that no one should be denied
water, therefore anyone should be allowed to cross even private
property to access water.
These different bases for property rights do not exist in isolation.
Rather, the various forms of laws or rules overlap, interact, and
inﬂuence each other. A change in international law may  change
state law to bring the latter into compliance; a change in national
law may  end up affecting custom; but also, customary or religious
rules may  shape statutory law.
However, property rights are only as strong as the underlying
institutions – whether state, community, religious, or other – that
shape, endorse and enforce the rights. Rights that are not widely
known, recognized, or enforced, have little meaning. Meinzen-
Dick and Nkonya (2007) describe these overlapping frameworks as
“force ﬁelds” of varying strength. In the capital city, among a highly
educated population that can call upon the courts or other govern-
ment ofﬁcials to enforce it, state law is generally stronger than in
the hinterland, where even the ofﬁcials – let alone the general pub-
lic – are often unaware of the provisions in statutory law. Each type
of property rights has associated bearers of the law, such as state
authorities, elders, religious leaders, or irrigation system ofﬁcials.
The strength of their authority certainly affects the strength of the
property rights that they enforce. However, none of these have the
ability to be everywhere and govern every water use or every act
to maintain (or damage) an irrigation system. Property rights and
obligations also have to be known by those immediately involved,
which requires internalizing the rules.
This has important implications for the sustainability of
irrigation systems. For any type of property rights to provide
security and incentives for careful management of the water or
infrastructure, the rules need to be clearly understood as well
as enforced. Four of Ostrom’s (1990) well-known “design princi-
ples” for the governance of irrigation systems relate to this: clearly
deﬁned boundaries, monitoring, graduated sanctions, and conﬂict
resolution mechanisms. These principles were developed from a
review of many studies of irrigation systems (as well as other types
of common property). Cox et al. (2010) validated these principles
5 See www.ramsar.org.
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ased on many more such studies and found that it is important
ot only that the resource and its use are monitored, but that the
onitoring be done either by the users themselves or by someone
ho is accountable to the users.
.2. Bundles of rights
As noted above, property rights to any resource almost never
onvey total rights, as is conjured up in notions of “freehold” or
ownership.” Rather than holding that up as a standard, it is better
o look at the different particular rights that different stakeholders
ave, which vary enormously, not only between different societies,
ut also between users within a particular locale. For comparative
urposes, these are often identiﬁed as bundles of rights, but even
ow these bundles are deﬁned varies. Schlager and Ostrom (1992)
eﬁne these bundles in terms of use rights of access and with-
rawal, and decision-making (or control) rights of management,
xclusion, and alienation. Others, following older Roman tradition,
roup the bundles as: usus rights to use the resource; usufructus
ights to derive income from a resource; abusus rights to change
he resource; and alienation rights to transfer the rights to others
see Eggertsson, 1990; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Scott, 2008).
ombining the two classiﬁcation systems, the following provide
xamples of the bundles of rights that are particularly relevant for
ustainable irrigation.
Access refers to rights for non consumptive use. The “right to ram-
ble” or cross someone’s land for a walk is a classic example of such
access. Swimming in a reservoir would be another such example.
Although access rights should be non consumptive, there may  be
crowding effects or wearing down of infrastructure if too many
people access land or water resources.
Withdrawal refers to rights to take resource units, such as con-
sumptive uses of water or taking produce of the land.
Usufructus rights to earn income from the resource are not
included in the Schlager and Ostrom (1992) framework, but can
be important where the state charges a water licensing fee.6
Management covers rights to make rules and modify the resource,
notably setting water delivery patterns or conducting mainte-
nance.
Exclusion refers to rights to determine who can use the resource,
and the transfer of those rights. In the case of irrigation, the right
to decide who can draw water for irrigation, and whether other
users can also access the water, infrastructure, or adjacent land
are all crucial exclusion rights.
Alienation refers to the rights to transfer management and exclu-
sion rights to others, such as by sale or lease.
”Ownership” or “complete property rights” are often interpreted
s holding all of these bundles of rights. If the term “water rights”
onjures up these images, then it is quite understandable that the
oncept would not seem to apply to water, especially in developing
ountries.7 This is especially true if one looks only for formal rights
ssued by the state. Recognizing this, Hodgson (2013) argues for a
ocus on tenure rather than rights:A key advantage of couching the issue of water allocation in
terms of tenure, rather than simply in terms of water rights, is
that it facilitates recognition of the fact that a complex range of
6 While usufructus rights may  be seen as embedded in the exclusion or alienation
ights, for understanding property rights in irrigation systems it is useful to identify
his as a separate right.
7 However, this is almost never found, even for so-called “freehold” land owner-
hip in the industrialized countries; there are almost always residual claimants who
estrict what one can do with that land, especially where that impinges on others.
oning regulations or bans on dumping waste are examples.anagement 145 (2014) 23–31 27
different, yet inter-linked, types of relationship exist between
people with respect to water resources. More speciﬁcally, the
question of water tenure goes beyond water rights and water
law (Hodgson, 2013:1).
This is a useful reminder that the focus needs to be on the insti-
tutional arrangements, rather than on speciﬁc formulations of what
is recognized as property rights.
5. Discussion: Property rights and irrigation management
Attention to property rights in developing country irrigation
systems came to prominence in the 1980s and 1990s in response
to concerns with irrigation system maintenance and water scarcity.
This section analyzes the policy debates and trends around each of
these areas, and the factors that inﬂuence security of tenure.
5.1. Maintenance
Many irrigation systems have been developed by government
agencies, but the performance of these systems has often been
far below expectations. With the ﬁscal crisis of the state in the
1980s, funding for system maintenance was often scarce, caus-
ing further deterioration of systems. At the same time, studies
of farmer-managed irrigation systems showed that in many cases
these performed better than state-managed systems, because the
farmers themselves undertook maintenance and irrigation staff
were responsible to the farmers (Lam, 1998; Ostrom, 1992; Tang,
1992; Uphoff, 1986).
Irrigation rehabilitation projects have identiﬁed one of the
causes of these problems with government-managed irrigation
system as being the tendency of the irrigators to feel that the
responsibility for maintenance of the systems rested with the gov-
ernment, but the government agencies lacked the resources or
capacity to do adequate maintenance. In order to deal with this,
many government ofﬁcials and donor-assisted irrigation programs
have called for farmers to develop a “sense of ownership” over
the irrigation systems so that they will take care of them (e.g.
Vermillion, 1987).8 Coward (1986) explicitly recognized the link
between property rights and management, but focused on the
effect of creating and maintaining property together as creating
the “social glue” that would strengthen irrigator groups to maintain
their irrigation.
Three reasons why property rights are important for maintain-
ing irrigation systems can be summarized as authority, incentives,
and resources (Meinzen-Dick, 2002).
• Authority: Unless farmers are recognized as having management
rights over the infrastructure and water, they do not have the
authority to make any changes in the irrigation systems, including
maintenance.
• Incentives: Property rights, especially use and usufructus (income)
rights, can provide incentives to maintain irrigation systems
because they create conﬁdence that the holder of the rights will
reap the future beneﬁts of investment and careful maintenance,
and bear the losses incurred by misuse of the resources.
• Resources: Control over water, land and infrastructure, includ-
ing usufructus rights to earn income from them, can generate
resources (cash or labor) for maintaining irrigation systems.In most government irrigation systems the state claims the
rights of management, exclusion, and earning income, and
8 Note that a “sense of ownership” has often been promoted by organizations that
are reluctant to transfer “real” ownership. It is rarely sufﬁcient without real rights
held by the water users.
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rrigators only have recognized use rights, often upon payment
f an irrigation fee that is then supposed to fund operation and
aintenance. However, there is often no direct link between the
ees paid by irrigators and the budgets available for the irrigation
gency, so the resources are not made available to sustain the
rrigation systems. At the same time, farmers lacked the author-
ty to undertake maintenance, and often had little incentive to do
o. Recognizing these problems, a number of irrigation manage-
ent transfer programs have included ceremonies for transferring
ownership” of the infrastructure of surface irrigation systems from
he government to farmers’ organizations (Vermillion, 1997). How-
ver, without rights to the water as well, the infrastructure itself is
f little value, and even is a burden to maintain. The water rights are
ey assets, because they determine both the level and distribution
f beneﬁts from irrigation.
This is not to imply that secure property rights will necessarily
ead to adequate maintenance. If the holder of the rights (farmers
r the state) has the authority but not the technical expertise, if the
eturns to irrigation are not high enough to provide incentives, or
f the costs of maintenance exceed what the usufructus rights can
enerate, having the rights will not be sufﬁcient. However, the role
f property rights merits greater attention than it has received in
ost discussions of irrigation maintenance or programs to improve
rrigation maintenance.
.2. Water scarcity
As noted above, as water becomes scarce, it brings users
nto greater competition with each other. Even relatively water-
bundant systems may  have scarcity at some times, whether during
 dry season or drought year, or as water use increases. Clear prop-
rty rights deﬁne allocation rules for who may  use how much water,
n what ways, at what time and place. By clarifying expectations,
hese rules can help reduce conﬂicts. But a further reason for atten-
ion to water rights in the context of scarcity is to provide incentives
or efﬁcient use and water conservation. Rosegrant and Binswanger
1994) argue that tradable property rights would create incentives
or irrigators (and other water users) to conserve water, because
hat they did not use could be sold to other uses (including to the
nvironment). Thus, rather than requiring some users to give up
ater, which often causes opposition, this would allow voluntary
ransfers from less efﬁcient users to those who could use it more
roductively, with those who give up water receiving payment. It
s beyond the scope of this paper to review empirical experiences
ith water markets,9 but it is important to note that tradable water
ights hinge upon vesting the right to transfer water to others in
he water users, rather than in the state. While irrigation manage-
ent reform programs in many countries have been willing (albeit
ometimes reluctantly) to transfer to the users the use, usufruct,
anagement, and exclusion rights, vesting alienation rights in the
sers has been even more controversial.
Some farmer-managed irrigation systems, as in Nepal and Bali,
ave developed water rights systems in which proportions of the
ows are separable from the land itself. In these cases, farm-
rs have the incentive to use the water efﬁciently to irrigate as
uch land as they can with their shares of water. Zekri and Al-
arshudi (2008) describe proportional water rights systems in
enturies-old falaj systems in Oman that even reserve a share of
he water rights to be auctioned to support the system operation
nd maintenance—thereby combining resources for sustaining the
ystem and tradable water rights in a context of water scarcity.
9 For reviews of water markets see Easter et al. (1998), Bjornlund and McKay
2002), Chong and Sunding (2006), Easter and Huang (in press).anagement 145 (2014) 23–31
The question of how water rights systems can adapt to grow-
ing scarcity, either through proportional allocations, tradable water
rights, or other mechanisms, is likely to become increasingly impor-
tant with increasing water use and climate change. Sharing ideas
from one place to another can assist in adaptation, but copying
systems of water rights is not likely to succeed, because it does not
account for the variations in the physical and institutional environ-
ment. For example, Chilean water law, with tradable water rights,
has been promoted as a model for other countries, but Bauer (2004)
shows that the Water Code was shaped by the particular history and
conditions of Chile, that are not found elsewhere, and even within
that context, the Chilean water law has key shortcomings as well
as strengths that need to be understood.
5.3. Security of tenure
It is not only the content of the rights that matter, but the secu-
rity with which they are held. Especially the strength of incentives
to sustain irrigation systems depends on how conﬁdent right-
holders can be that they will hold that right in the future. Key
aspects of tenure security include the expected duration of the right
and its robustness.
Duration of water rights are complex because of the inherent
ﬂuctuations of the water cycle; these are becoming more severe
and uncertain with climate change. Thus, it is difﬁcult to know,
from one year to another, whether a water right can be realized the
next year. Here infrastructure can increase water tenure security,
by providing storage (reservoirs or groundwater) to buffer against
short-term ﬂuctuations.
Robustness of property rights refer to their ability to with-
stand challenges. Some of these challenges come from the physical
environment (e.g. weather ﬂuctuations or landslides that destroy
infrastructure). Other challenges, however, come from the insti-
tutional environment. For example, immigrant communities may
begin using water from the same source as other right-holders, with
some basis for claiming that right. Or the state may decide to extend
an irrigation system, creating new claimants, often to the detriment
of existing users.
In some cases, robustness of property rights comes from being
able to resist such challenges (e.g. by exercising exclusion rights
to prevent new claimants from taking water away from the origi-
nal right-holders). State recognition can play an important role in
creating tenure security, especially where the state has enforce-
ment capacity. Yet in many parts of Africa, in particular, even land
is held in customary tenure without formal state recognition, and
the costs of developing full cadastres and titling programs are very
high, often prohibitively so because of the cost of demarcating
property, registering it, settling disputes, and then keeping any reg-
istries up to date. It is even more expensive and difﬁcult to develop
registries of water rights, especially for millions of smallholder
farmers, ﬁshers, or other small-scale water users (van Koppenet
al., 2007). Hodgson (2013) notes that many minor uses of water are
exempt from requirements to register, especially for basic liveli-
hood needs. But this can also create insecurity because it denies
those users of state protection. This is particularly an issue in cases
where so-called “land grabs” by outside investors have also become
“water grabs”, taking water away from existing users. For exam-
ple, Bues and Theesfeld (2012) analyze how large-scale farms in
Ethiopia took water away from farmer-managed irrigation systems,
because of the outside investors’ greater power and ties to the state.
Robustness also comes from being able to adapt to new situ-
ations, particularly changes in the hydrologic regime. Formalized
state-issued rights may  provide less adaptive capacity than sys-
tems in which farmers are able to play a greater role in setting and
modifying the rules, i.e. when users have management rights.
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Both infrastructure and institutions can play a role in increasing
ecurity of tenure, especially over water. The role of storage (infra-
tructure) in helping people respond to droughts has already been
entioned. Pipes that reduce transmission losses can increase con-
dence that users will receive the water they are entitled to. Meters
nd information technology (e.g. monitoring others’ water uses)
an increase users’ conﬁdence that if they follow the rules, others
ill as well because all will be monitored and can be caught if they
reak the rules. But these technologies do not work on their own.
omeone has to operate the reservoirs, read the meters, or provide
he information; hence institutional arrangements are needed to
nsure the infrastructure delivers.
South Africa’s experience with the National Water Act (RSA,
998) is instructive of the challenges of developing an equitable
ater rights system that responds to water scarcity, giving due
riority to environmental and basic domestic water uses. Despite
ctive consultation in developing the law, implementation has
roved a challenge, especially with limitations of state capacity to
onitor and enforce (Schreiner, 2013), continuing resistance by
owerful water users who stand to lose from the reforms, and lim-
tations on the ability to redress power asymmetries through water
lone, without also addressing land rights (Kemerink et al., 2011).
Rather than looking for any prescriptions for property rights
eforms, it is more realistic to recognize that changes are likely
o be a process of what Cleaver (2001:26) refers to as: “insti-
utional bricolage”, a process by which people consciously and
nconsciously draw on existing social and cultural arrangements
o shape institutions in response to changing situations.” An impor-
ant aspect of this understanding of institutional change—whether
n property rights or coordination institutions, is that people them-
elves are actors, shaping the outcomes, with outsiders (including
he state) playing variable roles.
. Conclusions
The development of irrigation systems that serve more than
ne farm require coordination systems and some form of property
ights to at least identify who has what rights to use, manage, and
xclude others from the associated land, infrastructure, and water.
ven for individual wells and rainwater harvesting, as more and
ore people start to irrigate, they impact other users in the water-
hed, and some form of coordination and rules governing water use
an help prevent conﬂicts and give users some assurance that their
nvestments in irrigation will be sustainable.
However, the state is not the only source of coordination and
roperty rights; collective action through customary institutions,
ewly developed user groups, and even market mechanism can
ll play a role. Nor do property rights need to include complete
ownership”: particular bundles of rights can be held by the state,
ser groups collectively, or different individual users. Use rights
f access and withdrawal, as well as usufructus rights to earn
ncome from the resources can provide incentives for investing
n and maintaining irrigation systems; management and exclu-
ion rights provide authority to do so; usufructus rights provide
evenue for operation and maintenance. Alienation rights that are
ransferrable, either seasonally (rental) or in perpetuity (sale), can
rovide incentives for those with existing water rights to con-
erve their use because they can gain income from transferring the
nused water to others.
What matters is the security of these rights—the conﬁdence that
hey provide that others will fulﬁll their duty to respect those rights.
ights are only as strong as the institutions that stand behind them.
here the state has very little effective capacity – as in remote
egions or when the state is weak – then customary rights are often
tronger, especially if their legitimacy is reinforced by widely heldanagement 145 (2014) 23–31 29
norms with internalize self-enforcement so they do not have to be
explicitly enforced by others. But customary rights alone may  not
be secure in contexts where the state decides to reallocate water
(or land) to other users.
As resources become more scarce, property rights systems need
to adapt. Irrigation development projects inherently change prop-
erty rights, whether explicitly assigning water and land rights,
or implicitly by generating rules about who can do what with
the water and infrastructure, or simply by creating new “facts on
the ground,” of where and when water is available, which forces
changes in property rights. Many irrigation management transfer
projects have included formal ceremonies to confer on the farmers
rights over the infrastructure (frequently only the onerous duties
to maintain the infrastructure without real rights over its actual
use and disposal), but rarely the water. The creation of transfer-
able property rights, as in Chile or Australia, have been discussed
but rarely implemented in developing countries (beyond informal
markets for groundwater in South Asia).
Recognition of the need for coordinating institutions and prop-
erty rights for sustainable and efﬁcient management of irrigation
is an important step. But identifying the important institutions
is relatively easy compared to ensuring that these are in place.
Efforts to improve irrigation by changing property rights systems
have often failed because they have not recognized the difﬁculty of
transplanting what is seen as clear property rights systems from
one place to another. Rapid reforms can be counter-productive.
They are unlikely to be fully implemented as planned, and create
uncertainty and resentment in the process. Negotiation with stake-
holders, looking for ways to compensate those who might lose out,
leads to more legitimacy of the reforms.
Institutional change is possible, but it needs to be seen as an
organic process, building on existing norms and practices, and rec-
ognizing that local people will be active in adapting – or even
resisting – external interventions. Analogies of “social engineering”
have been misplaced, because they imply a mechanistic approach.
What is required is a more nuanced approach, which may involve
adaptation to the physical and institutional environment. A good
strategy is to start with people’s experiences with water—how they
access it, what claims they make for their different water uses. This
will help to identify the relevant legal frameworks to address. Then
an intervention can work to strengthen the claims of poor people
for their important water uses. In many cases, water rights become
operationalized through user organizations. Ensuring that women,
smallholders, livestock keepers, or other poor and marginalized
water users are represented in these organizations is an impor-
tant step to strengthening their water rights, but is often difﬁcult,
because of overt resistance from those who  do not want to share
water rights and decision-making, or because of social challenges
of including marginalized groups in local organizations.
Ofﬁcially-recognized rights also help ensure that their holders
have a “seat at the table” in discussions about further water devel-
opment or land use changes that may  impinge on their rights. Joint
planning and modeling of water resource development with gov-
ernment agencies and different user groups helps to put this into
practice, but it may  require strengthening the capacity of both the
agencies and the users. There is no single, optimal property right
system for irrigations systems—in developing countries or else-
where. Rather, we need a range of options and the understanding
necessary to be able to tailor them to their (ever-changing) physical
and institutional context.Acknowledgments
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